I. The Methods of Treaty Interpretation Adopted by Tribunals

A. Interpretation in Accordance with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
This Article provides that a treaty be "interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose." The Tribunal will adhere to these rules of interpretation in considering the disputed provisions of the Treaty. ...
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In referring to the rules of interpretation contained in the VCLT, tribunals sometimes point out that these rules reflect customary international law. Thus the Tribunal in Tokios Tokelės v. Convention on the Law of Treaties which reflect the customary international law concerning treaty interpretation. Accordingly, treaties have to be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of the object and purpose of the Treaty, while recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work and the circumstances of its conclusion, only in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of the aforementioned methods of interpretation. Reference should also be made to the principle of effectiveness (effet utile), which, too plays an important role in interpreting treaties.
Among the principles contained in Article 31 VCLT an interpretation that looks at the treaty's object and purpose is particularly popular. 8 In the context of BITs this often leads to an interpretation that is favourable to investor. For instance, the Tribunal in Noble Ventures v. On the other hand the Tribunal in Amco v. Indonesia 11 in interpreting the ICSID Convention pointed out that investment protection was also in the longer term interest of host States:
...to protect investments is to protect the general interest of development and of developing countries.
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The most frequent way to find a treaty's object and purpose was to look at the preamble. The
Tribunal in Siemens v. Argentina 13 said in this respect:
81. The Tribunal considers that the Treaty has to be interpreted neither liberally nor restrictively, as neither of these adverbs is part of Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention. The Tribunal shall be guided by the purpose of the Treaty as expressed in its title and preamble. It is a treaty "to protect" and "to promote" investments. The preamble provides that the parties have agreed to the provisions of the Treaty for the purpose of creating favorable conditions for the investments of nationals or companies of one of the two States in the territory of the other State. Both parties recognize that the promotion and protection of these investments by a treaty may stimulate private economic initiative and increase the well-being of the peoples of both countries. The problem with the expressio unius principle is not so much a lack of consistency of the tribunals but its limited usefulness. Whether the mention of one item or a list of items in a provision really excludes the relevance of other items depends very much on the particular circumstances and cannot be answered in a generalized way. Similarly, the question whether a provision in one treaty may be taken as proof that another treaty that lacks such a provision was meant to exclude the effects of the provision is difficult to answer in a generalized way with the tools of abstract logic.
b) Interpretation in the Light of Other Treaties
The large number of BITs, often containing similar or identical provisions, lends itself to a comparative approach. Especially the BITs of the host State but also of the investor's home
State with third countries often lead to extensive comparisons and inferences. 38 The similarities and differences in the treaties offer infinite possibilities to try and draw conclusions.
At the simplest level, it seems plausible that identical or very similar wording in different treaties has the same meaning unless a different meaning can be gathered from the As to the third general principle, the term is not to be examined in isolation or in abstracto, but in the context of the treaty and in the light of its object and purpose. One result of this third general principle, being relevant to Methanex's first argument on GATT jurisprudence and Article 1102 NAFTA, is that, as noted by the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in The MOX Plant case (as also applied in The OSPAR case): "the application of international law rules on interpretation of treaties to identical or similar provisions of different treaties may not yield the same results, having regard, to, inter alia, differences in the respective contexts, objects and purposes, subsequent practice of parties and travaux préparatoires. " In Siemens v. Argentina, 44 Argentina had argued that the fact that a particular treaty provision departed from Germany's model BIT and was hence specifically negotiated should be given special weight in its interpretation. The Tribunal rejected this contention. 106. The Respondent has stressed the fact that the dispute settlement clause departs from the standard bilateral investment treaty of Germany in order to support its argument that this was a clause specially negotiated and hence which should be differentiated from the rest. The acceptance of a clause from a model text does not invest this clause with either more or less legal force than other clauses which may had [sic] been more difficult to negotiate. The end result of the negotiations is an agreed text and the legal significance of each clause is not affected by how arduous was the negotiating path to arrive there. The Tribunal feels bound, in its interpretation of the Treaty, by the expressed intention of the parties to promote investments and create conditions favorable to them. The Tribunal finds that when the intention of the parties has been clearly expressed, it is not in its power to second-guess their intentions by attributing special meaning to phrases based on whether they were or were not part of a model draft. ...
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E. The Use of Travaux Préparatoires
According to Article 32 of the VCLT, the materials reflecting the preparatory work to a treaty only figure as supplementary means of interpretation. They are to be used only to confirm a meaning resulting from the primary means of interpretation contained in Article 31 or to determine the meaning if the primary means leave the meaning ambiguous or obscure or lead to a result that is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.
In practice, resort to travaux préparatoires seems to be determined less by their position among the canons of interpretation than by their availability. The drafting history of the ICSID Convention is documented in detail, readily available and easily accessible through an analytical index. 46 As a consequence ICSID tribunals frequently resort to it.
By contrast, the negotiating history of BITs is typically not documented. Therefore tribunals do not have the possibility to rely on travaux préparatoires even if they are minded to do so.
In For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that, pursuant to Article 32, recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation only in the limited circumstances there specified. Other than that, the approach of the Vienna Convention is that the text of the treaty is deemed to be the authentic expression of the intentions of the parties; and its elucidation, rather than wide-ranging searches for the supposed intentions of the parties, is the proper object of interpretation.
II. The Authority of Previous Decisions
A. The Treatment of "Precedents"
Reliance on past decisions is a fundamental feature of any orderly decision process. Drawing on the experience of past decisions plays an important role in securing the necessary uniformity and stability of the law. The need for a coherent case law is evident. It strengthens the predictability of decisions and enhances their authority. In a subsequent decision in the same case the Tribunal was even more specific. It said:
The Tribunal agrees with the view expressed by the Argentine Republic in the hearing on jurisdiction held in respect of this dispute, to the effect that the decisions of ICSID tribunals are not binding precedents and that every case must be examined in the light of its own circumstances. 67 By far the most extensive discussion of the value of previous decisions as "precedents" can be found in AES Corp. v. Argentina. 68 In that case the Claimant had pointed out that all of Argentina's objections to jurisdiction had been raised repeatedly in similar terms in other cases and that these same objections had been rejected consistently by other tribunals. 69 In response, Argentina insisted on the specificity of each treaty involved and said:
Repeating decisions taken in other cases, without making the factual and legal distinctions, may constitute an excess of power and may affect the integrity of the international system for the protection of investments.
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The Tribunal agreed with Argentina and stated that the provisions of Article 25 of the ICSID Convention, together with fundamental principles of public international law, dictate that:
... each decision or award delivered by an ICSID Tribunal is only binding on the parties to the dispute settled by this decision or award. 71 There is so far no rule of precedent in general international law; nor is there any within the specific ICSID system for the settlement of disputes between one State party to the Convention and the National of another State Party. This was in particular illustrated by diverging positions respectively taken by two ICSID tribunals on issues dealing with the interpretation of arguably similar language in two different BITs.
The AES Tribunal pointed out that each BIT has its own identity and that striking similarities in the wording of many BITs often dissimulate real differences. 73 The Tribunal drew the following conclusion:
From the above derive at least two consequences: the first is that the findings of law made by one ICSID tribunal in one case in consideration, among others, of the terms of a determined BIT, are not necessarily relevant for other ICSID tribunals, which were constituted for other cases; the second is that, although Argentina had already submitted similar objections to the jurisdiction of other tribunals prior to those raised in the present case before this Tribunal, Argentina has a valid and legitimate right to raise the objections it has chosen for opposing the jurisdiction of this Tribunal. This led the Tribunal to the following compromise solution:
An identity of the basis of jurisdiction of these tribunals, even when it meets with very similar if not even identical facts at the origin of the disputes, does not suffice to apply systematically to the present case positions or solutions already adopted in these cases. Each tribunal remains sovereign and may retain, as it is confirmed by ICSID practice, a different solution for resolving the same problem; but decisions on jurisdiction dealing with the same or very similar issues may at least indicate some lines of reasoning of real interest; this Tribunal may consider them in order to compare its own position with those already adopted by its predecessors and, if it shares the views already expressed by one or more of these tribunals on a specific point of law, it is free to adopt the same solution.
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Having made these broad statements on the limited value of "precedents", the Tribunal actually proceeded to examine and rely on previous decisions by other tribunals. The decision in Gas Natural v. Argentina 79 demonstrates the Tribunal's cautious attitude towards "precedents" not only in its wording but also in the decision's structure. The Tribunal first gave its Decision on Jurisdiction without reference to previous cases. 80 After having reached a result it stated:
36. The Tribunal wishes to emphasize that it has rendered its decision independently, without considering itself bound by any other judgments or arbitral awards. Having reached its conclusions, however, the Tribunal thought it useful to compare its conclusion with the conclusions reached in other recent arbitrations conducted pursuant to the ICSID Arbitration Rules and arising out of claims under contemporary bilateral investment treaties. We summarize a few of these decisions here, and confirm that we have not found or been referred to any decisions or awards reaching a contrary conclusion.
81
Only after having made that statement does the Tribunal examine a number of previous decisions which it finds to be in line with its own conclusions. 82 Its conclusion is as follows:
52. In sum, the Tribunal is satisfied that its analyses and decisions, independently arrived at, are consistent with the conclusions of other arbitral tribunals faced with similar issues. It does not follow that the ultimate decisions of this Tribunal on the merits will be wholly consistent with those of other arbitral tribunals, because different claims have been based on different treaties and different factual situations.
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Whether a decision that relies preponderantly or exclusively on previous decisions might be subject to annulment for that reason may be subject to doubt. No decision on annulment in ICSID proceedings has ever annulled an award because it rested its reasoning on precedents.
But an application for annulment that alleges an excess of powers or a failure to state reasons because the tribunal has simply relied on earlier decisions without making an independent decision or developing its own reasons is entirely possible. From the perspective of tribunals it seems wiser not to expose themselves to this charge. In some cases tribunals did not follow earlier decisions but adopt different solutions. At times they simply adopted a different solution without distancing themselves from the earlier decision. At other times they referred to the earlier decision and pointed out that they were unconvinced by what another tribunal had said and that, therefore, their decision departed from the one adopted earlier.
B. Inconsistent Decisions
A clear example of a rejection of an earlier decision occurred in SGS v. Philippines. 84 The
Tribunal discussed the earlier decision in SGS v. Pakistan 85 and voiced its disagreement with some of the answers given there. The SGS v. Philippines Tribunal said:
As will become clear, the present Tribunal does not in all respects agree with the conclusions reached by the SGS v. Pakistan Tribunal on issues of the interpretation of arguably similar language in the SwissPhilippines BIT. This raises a question whether, nonetheless, the present Tribunal should defer to the answers given by the SGS v. Pakistan Tribunal. The ICSID Convention provides only that awards rendered under it are "binding on the parties" (Article 53(1)), a provision which might be regarded as directed to the res judicata effect of awards rather than their impact as precedents in later cases. In the Tribunal's view, although different tribunals constituted under the ICSID system should in general seek to act consistently with each other, in the end it must be for each tribunal to exercise its competence in accordance with the applicable law, which will by definition be different for each BIT and each Respondent State. Moreover there is no doctrine of precedent in international law, if by precedent is meant a rule of the binding effect of a single decision. There is no hierarchy of international tribunals, and even if there were, there is no good reason for allowing the first tribunal in time to resolve issues for all later tribunals. It must be initially for the control mechanisms provided for under the BIT and the ICSID Convention, and in the longer term for the development of a common legal opinion or jurisprudence constante, to resolve the difficult legal questions discussed by the SGS v. Pakistan Tribunal and also in the present decision.
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The consistency of decisions has become a prominent issue in investment arbitration. tribunals to these provisions has not been uniform. In some cases the tribunals found that noncompliance with the waiting periods did not affect their jurisdiction. 90 In other cases they reached the opposite conclusion. 
III. Consistency and Harmonization
Fortunately the problem of inconsistency is not pervasive. Most tribunals carefully examine earlier decisions and accept these as authority most of the time. But sometimes they disagree with them and make their disagreement known. In addition, the growing number of simultaneous cases makes it increasingly likely that tribunals may reach conflicting results without realizing it. Therefore, the problem of conflicting awards is a reality and has led to a discussion on how to address the problem.
A. Interpretative Statements by States
Occasionally the two States parties to the BIT may issue a joint statement without binding force on a question of interpretation pending before a tribunal. In CME v. Czech Republic 93 the BIT between the Czech Republic and the Netherlands provided for "consultations" with a view to resolving any issue of interpretation and application of the Treaty. Pursuant to this procedure, the Netherlands and the Czech Republic issued "Agreed Minutes" containing a "common position" on the BIT's interpretation, after the Tribunal had issued a partial award.
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The Tribunal took this joint statement into account as supporting its view. In one case the government of the Claimant's nationality took the unusual step of writing to ICSID to voice its disapproval of an interpretation given by an ICSID tribunal. In SGS v. NAFTA tribunals have accepted this interpretation as binding. 105 The Tribunal in Methanex v. This method is efficient, but has a serious drawback. States will strive to issue official interpretations to influence proceedings to which they are parties. As the example of the July 2001 interpretation of the FTC under NAFTA demonstrates, the home States of disputing investors are less interested in interpretations favourable to their nationals in pending disputes than in interpretations that favour State respondents generally. It is obvious that a mechanism whereby a party to a dispute is able to influence the outcome of judicial proceedings, by issuing official interpretation to the detriment of the other party, is incompatible with principles of a fair procedure and is hence undesirable.
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b) Appeals Procedures
Another perceived solution is the creation of an appeals facility that would open the possibility to review decisions thereby increasing the chances of a consistent case law. A number of US treaties foresee this possibility in the form of an appellate body or similar mechanism. 108 The United States Model BIT of 2004 contains the following provision in an Annex:
Annex D Possibility of a Bilateral Appellate Mechanism
Within three years after the date of entry into force of this Treaty, the Parties shall consider whether to establish a bilateral appellate body or similar mechanism to review awards rendered under Article 34 in arbitrations commenced after they establish the appellate body or similar mechanism.
This idea of a bilateral appeals mechanism has found entry into the US BIT with Uruguay. 
c) Preliminary Rulings
An appeals facility is not necessarily the best mechanism to achieve coherence and consistency in the interpretation of investment treaties. Appeal presupposes a decision that will be attacked for some alleged flaw in order to be repaired. Rather than try and fix the damage after the fact through an appeal, it is more economical and effective to address it preventively before it even occurs.
A method to secure coherence and consistency that has been remarkably successful is to allow for preliminary rulings while the original proceedings are still pending. 116 Under such a system a tribunal would suspend proceedings and request a ruling on a question of law from a body established for that purpose. This procedure has been very successfully used in the Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member State, that court or tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give judgment, request the Court of Justice to give a ruling thereon.
Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a court or tribunal of a Member State against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, that court or tribunal shall bring the matter before the Court of Justice.
situation where it wants to depart from a decision by a previous tribunal or where there are conflicting previous decisions. In such a situation the tribunal might be required to suspend proceedings and request a ruling from the central decision maker. Once that ruling has been forthcoming the original tribunal would continue its proceedings. This method has turned out to be very successful to ward off inconsistency and fragmentation.
A number of details would have to be worked out.
One is under what circumstances a tribunal would request a preliminary ruling and whether it would be under an obligation to do so.
Another would be whether these rulings would bind the tribunal or would merely constitute recommendations. Not least, the composition of a body charged with giving preliminary rulings would need to be discussed.
Preliminary rulings would leave Article 53 of the ICSID Convention untouched. They would not affect the principles of expediency and finality, two of the chief assets of arbitration. And they would help to prevent the development of inconsistencies rather than create a costly and time consuming repair mechanism.
